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In the field of hioethics, freedom and autonomy assume the ability of self-regulation and
determination. Ifone has the ability to make one 's own decisions, then one represents an autono-
mous and free person. Such a view of autonomy faces many difficidties, because it idtimately
limits those who can be considered autonomous. Tlie Orthodox theology ofthe one Hypostasis of
Jesus Christ presents an alternative to such a notions of autonomy, freedom and personhood. A
person can be said to possessfreedom and autonomy not when she or he can make decisions for
herself or himself, but when she or he is perfected in Christ. Wlien people begin to live in com-
mimion with one another and with God, their freedom increases. In this essay, the author intro-
duces the Orthodox theology of the two natures of Christ, united to the Divine Hypostasis of the
Logos at the moment of the Incarnation, and its implications for human freedom and autonomy.
Introduction
Few events in the history of the world
have had as much impact on society as the
Incarnation of the Logos. The Incarnation
represents the greatest sign of love that God
has for the entire creation. The Logos of
God, by personalizing human nature in Hy-
postasis, offers to each hiunan being the op-
portunity to regain that once lost in the Gar-
den of Eden. The Incarnation of the Logos
and the Hypostatic union can also serve as
tools for the informed consent process. A
close look at the Hypostasis of the divine
Logos and the relationship between the hu-
man and divine natures of Christ reveals an
imderstanding of freedom and personhood
not commonly held. This essay attempts to
reveal this ontological perception of free-
dom/personhood and apply and compare it
to informed consent in the realm of contem-
porary bioethics.
The Hypostasis of thie Pre-Eternal
Logos
Although Chalcedon offered the world
a detailed understanding of the Person of
Christ, Christology did not end in 45 1. The
Fourth Ecumenical Council expressed the
union of the two natures into one hyposta-
sis, but it did not address how these two na-
tures of Christ—human and divine— relate
to one another in the one Person/Hyposta-
sis of Jesus Christ. The Fifth Ecumenical
Council held in Constantinople (553) dealt
with this issue. The Fathers of this council
state:
The Word of God is united with the
flesh hypostatically, and that therefore
there is but one hypostasis or only one
Person, and the holy Council of
Chalcedon has professed in this sense
the one Person of our Lord Jesus
Christ.'
In his treatise of the Orthodox faith. Saint John
of Damascus reaffirms and clarifies this.
The divine hypostasis of God the Word
existed before all else and is without
time and eternal... and in an incompre-
hensible manner known only to
Himself, [caused] the flesh derived
from the holy Virgin to subsist in the
very hypostasis that was before all the
ages. . .and the hypostasis of the Word,
which was formerly simple, became
compound, yea compounded of two
perfect natures, divinity and humanity.^
The Church Fathers hold that one cannot
come to an understanding of the human na-
The Boston Theological Institute
ture of Christ apart from the pre-existing Hy-
postasis/Person of the Logos. This claim on
the part of Orthodox theology results in com-
prehending the one Hypostasis as only divine.
This of course does not prevent the Logos
from actively taking human nature onto the
Hypostasis. This assertion does not suggest
that Christ could not be fully human, but rather
it reaffirms the patristic view that the charac-
teristic of natural humanity attains its poten-
tial when human nature exists in a theocentric
reality.
Also, the decision of the Fifth Ecumeni-
cal Council reveals another important conse-
quence. Claiming that the Divine Logos ac-
quires human nature implies that the human
nature does not become a part of another hu-
man hypostasis— the human nature of Jesus
Christ does not find its personalization in an-
other person but in the Logos. Human na-
ture, which the Logos takes, obtains its sub-
Because each person has the rightfreely to
determine whatprocedures she or he will
undergo, each physician then should also
have the rightfreely to choose not to follow
through with the patient's demands ifthey
conflict with his or her own autonomy.
sistence from the Hypostasis of the Logos and
should not be considered as anhypostatic—
existing on its own.^ John Meyendorff con-
cludes:
Hypostasis is the personal, "acting"
source of natural life; but it is not
"nature", or life itself
The Church never conceives of either the hu-
man nature or the divine nature of Jesus
Christ as existing apart from the actual Per-
son/Hypostasis of the Logos. Yannaras
makes this point absolutely clear in his Ele-
ments ofFaith:
God is God since He is a Person, that
is, since his Existence does not depend
on anything, not even his Nature or
Essence. As a Person—that is
freely— He constitutes His essence or
Nature, it is not His Nature or Essence
which makes His Existence obliga-
tory.^
This intricate doctrine of the anhypostasis
of Christ's human nature gives rise to ques-
tions regarding Christ's freedom and will. If
Christ's human nature exists only when con-
nected to the divine Second Person of the
Trinity, then does Christ truly possess free
will? Orthodox theology understands
Christ's human freedom and free will again
in the context of the divine Hypostasis. By
uniting human and divine nature in Hyposta-
sis, in turn, Christ's human nature in actual-
ity transcends all earthly limitations. John
Zizioulas argues that one's personhood takes
shape by the relationships that she or he
makes. The stronger relationships in life
usually take precedence and, thus, shape who
S one is as an individual.
The same can be said
about Jesus Christ. Be-
cause Jesus Christ's
Hypostasis/Person con-
tinues to be that of the
divine Logos, the rela-
tionship of the Son to
the Father never ceases,
but instead constitutes
the person-hood of
Jesus Christ.
Therefore, the Sixth Ecumenical Coun-
cil held in Constantinople (681) correctly
stated:
It was necessary that the will of the
flesh move itself, but also that is be
submitted to the divine will .... For just
as His most Holy and immaculate flesh,
animated by His soul, has not been
destroyed by being divinised but
remained in its own state and kind, so
also His human will has not been
destroyed by being divinised. It has
been rather preserved.^
This council teaches the presence of two
wills in Christ; it also teaches that the hu-
man will submits to the divine will. This
precedence given to the divine will does not
attenuate humanity. Rather, it signifies the
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ultimate fulfillment of humanity, since Or-
thodoxy identifies true and authentic human-
ity as union and participation with God. The
entire human race has, because of Christ's
Incarnation, been given the possibility of
union to the Godhead. Thus, the divine Hy-
postasis of Jesus Christ serves as a witness
and as an example for all of humanity. In
Jesus Christ, one observes how the human
person can once again turn his or her face to
God.
Bioethics and Informed Consent
Autonomy
Informed consent has become a growing
issue in today's medical and scientific fields.
Whereas the cloning of human beings and the
creation of organs from stem cells still find
themselves in the theoretical stage of their
development, informed consent can be said
to represent bioethics in practice. Informed
consent not only appears in the discussions
of institutional review boards (IRBs). but it
has also made its way into the everyday lives
of all human beings. Each time a person en-
ters the hospital, a consent forni must be com-
pleted, before any treatment or research can
begin, the physicians and scientists must make
sure that the person seeking aid places his or
her signature on the bottom of the consent
form.
One cannot begin to speak about informed
consent without first referring to the concept
of autonomy. Rarely will one read an article
on informed consOnt without coming acioss
this concept. Faden, King, and Beauchamp
acknowledge this reality when they write,
"Autonomy is the most frequently mentioned
moral principle in the literature on informed
consent." ^ Autonomy has come to imply the
right of "self-determination, self-rule, and in-
dividual choice." ^ This means that each in-
dividual has the right to accept or reject treat-
ment if she or he feels that it will be harmful,
regardless of potential for this treatment ulti-
mately to have a beneficial outcome. As each
person has the right to be an autonomous
agent, it can be argued that physicians and re-
searchers have a dun' to protect and respect
the autonomy of each person who steps into
the hospital or the laboratory. Because people
seek medical aid when they are in a highly
vulnerable state, many believe that only when
they give up their autonomy will they receive
better treatment. Physicians must do every-
thing in their power to protect and maintain
the ailing person's autonomy by making them
active participants in their therapy.
A problem arises when one considers that
physicians and researchers also have the right
of autonomy and self-determination. Since
respecting autonomy ultimately implies that
each individual has the right to choose and
accept those actions that meet their standards
of beneficence, Joel James Shuman analyzes
the conflict that may arise between what a pa-
tient views as beneficial and what a physi-
cian understands as beneficent action. He
writes:
My caregiver is under no obligation to
provide me with the services I want if
those services are not consistent with
her understanding of what constitutes
nonmaleficent/beneficent treatment; she
is also an autonomous agent whose
autonomy must be respected.''
Because each person has the right freely to
determine what procedures she or he will un-
dergo, each physician then should also have
the right freely to choose not to follow through
with the patient's demands if they conflict
with his or her own autonomy.
Competency
Informed consent also attempts to promote
and protect an individual's autonomy by mov-
ing beyond the mere collection of a signature.
As Wendler and Rackoff point out, there are
countless instances when "individuals are
perfectly willing to sign, but unable to do so."
'" Those who concern themselves with the
informed consent of patients turn their atten-
tion to one's competency. Competency can
be separated into two categories— general and
specific. As Stephen B. Billick writes:
[G]eneral competency is determined by
the ability to handle all of one's affairs
in an adequate manner. Specific
competency is defined only in relation
to a specific act."
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When informed consent is required, physi-
cians should look for signs of specific com-
petency in their patients because "a patient
may be unable to tell you what day of the week
it is and yet be perfectly capable of under-
standing why they need to have their broken
arm repaired." ''
A physician may be able to determine in-
competency in cases of infants, young chil-
dren, and severely retarded people, because
they do not exhibit signs of complex cogni-
tive processing. In such situations, the phy-
sician cannot obtain true informed consent
from these individuals and must look to ac-
quire consent from a person legally entrusted
with the care of the patient. At the same time,
though, such self-evident cases do not always
present themselves to the physician. Chil-
dren, especially teenagers, represent a group
of individuals who often clearly show signs
of general competency but may not always
express the specific competency needed to
understand the therapy process and its con-
sequences. The same can also be said about
the elderly.
Further difficulties present themselves
when one uses competency as a factor for de-
termining whether an individual can be con-
sidered an autonomous agent who can freely
It must he said that Orthodox Christianity
does not understand autonomy andfree-
dom in the same sense as contemporary
bioethics. The Church's attention is
directed to Jesus Christ and the Holy
Trinity as the modelsfor autonomous
livingfor all human beings.
choose to undergo a medical procedure or to
refuse it. With so much weight given to com-
petency and to cognitive ability, there is a risk
of compromising or even abolishing indi-
vidual autonomy, central in the study of in-
formed consent. '^ No one denies the fact that
people ought to be able cognitively to under-
stand the medical procedure and the available
alternatives; but when they do not possess the
specific competency to do this, should they
be denied the right to make decisions for them-
selves? By understanding children as incom-
petent to register specific medical informa-
tion, physicians and the law refuse to acknowl-
edge them as autonomous agents. J. D. Baum
and J. P. H. Shield, from their studies on child
health, do not agree with such an understand-
ing of competency because often "the child
may have a more stable and balanced view-
point than either parent." ''' Similarly, when
an adult in fact possesses "specific" compe-
tency yet begins to suffer from a disease that
limits his or her brain function such that in-
formation cannot be processed in the same
maimer as before, society claims that this per-
son no longer possesses autonomous quali-
ties. Since competency has so much to do
with specific cognitive functions, people who
have not yet attained such faculty or who have
regressed in their brain functions are denied
the right to act as autonomous agents.
Comprehension
The comprehensiveness of consent forms
introduces another aspect of the informed con-
sent issue. For a physician to be able to pro-
nounce a patient competent to make highly
complicated and important decisions regard-
ing his/her well-being,
the information that hos-
pitals and research
groups present to the pa-
tient must be clear and
intelligible. The forms
that explain the medical
procedures, their side ef-
fects, and alternatives,
must be written at the
comprehension level of
the patient. Giving vital
information to people loses its meaning and
significance when they have no way of un-
derstanding it.
The intricate language of many consent
forms reflects the highly bureaucratic nature
of the medical field. Also, because of medical
malpractice litigation, the consent process has
transformed into a means of legally protecting
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the medical institutions and the companies that
sponsor research. Mark Hochhauser concludes
that, as a result of the present condition of
medicine and research, "consent form language
(especially when dealing with "compensation')
is often full of iegalese.'" '^ Many people do
not have the knowledge to understand this type
of language and. as a result, consent to proce-
dures without comprehending what they en-
tail. Once again, by consenting to a procedure
without proper information and its comprehen-
sion, a person does not act as a fully autono-
mous agent, but rather as a prisoner of his or
her own ignorance.
As recently as 1998, President Bill Clinton
signed a "Presidential Memorandum on Plain
Language," which called for all government
organizations to use "plain" language in all
of their new documents written after 1 Octo-
ber 1998. and to complete the rewriting of
older documents in a more understandable
language by 1 January 2002.'^ Although this
signifies a step in the right direction, one must
be aware of the fact that not everyone living
in the United States speaks English. There-
fore, even greater sensitivity to the compre-
hension issue is called for: consent forms must
also seek to meet the needs of those who do
not speak English.
Besides the complexity of the language
that consent forms employ, the lack of expe-
rience with the consent process on the part of
the physicians and researchers greatly de-
creases the comprehension of the patients. In
a survey given to 144 resident physicians from
three different hospitals, fewer than half of
those who answered the survey recalled a
course or seminar on informed consent. '^
Because so many physicians received insuf-
ficient training in informed consent, they of-
ten fail to communicate the risks and alterna-
tives involved in the treatment they prescribe.
Such poor communication lowers a patient's
level of comprehension and the level of com-
petency of the patient, thereby limiting his or
her autonomy and self-regulation.
Bioethicists, to help eliminate this prob-
lem from hospitals, have devised other means
of communicating necessary information.
Among the newer innovations, video presen-
tations are used to convey indispensable in-
formation and explanations of the medical
procedure at hand. Patricia Agre and Kathleen
McKee's survey of 204 patients and 102 of
their family members reveals astounding re-
sults and hope for the future. After being
shown a video that teaches important infor-
mation about colonoscopy— a procedure that
each patient needed—95% of the patients and
98% of the family members believed that the
video presented the information in a clear and
comprehensible manner. Although the results
of this survey offer hope for the effectiveness
of such educational techniques, the real po-
tential for informed consent lies in the likeli-
hood that "the addition of the videotape [to
the process leading to informed consent] may
have benefit in preparing patients to have a
meaningful dialogue with their physician." '^
Orthodoxy and informed Consent
The Greek Orthodox Church does not yet
have any position or formal teaching on in-
formed consent, but it does possess an un-
derstanding of human nature founded on "the
revelation of the truth about God." ''^ With
this in hand, it becomes feasible to formu-
late a response to the modern approach to
informed consent. First, it must be said that
Orthodox Christianity does not understand
autonomy and freedom in the same sense as
contemporary bioethics. The Church's at-
tention is directed to Jesus Christ and the
Holy Trinity as the models for autonomous
living for all human beings. As stated ear-
lier, Jesus Christ has human free will, ex-
pressed not only in individual choices accord-
ing to personal preference, but also in allow-
ing his will naturally to follow His Father's.
This does not prevent Christ from being a
free human person. Rather, it points to the
fact that only when one no longer can make
decisions as isolated individuals does one
start to live autonomously. As Hierotheos
Vlachos states:
The "gnomic will," that is to say the pos-
sibility of choice, is an indication of the
imperfection of man's nature. Therefore
man cannot have absolute freedom. Only
God has freedom in the absolute sense of
the word, since God is uncreated.-"
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One should not take this statement to suggest
that only when a person becomes a mindless
slave does she or he acquire ultimate au-
tonomy. Instead, the mere fact that a person
has the opportunity to choose between God's
natural will and his or her own will points to
the reality of human imperfection. St. Paul
describes this imperfect state:
In my members another law is at war
with the law of my mind, making me
captive to the law of sin that dwells in
my members (Rom 7:23).
The Incarnation of the Logos serves to help
human beings overcome this struggle. Each
person overcomes his or her own desires and
moves to do that which once came naturally,
when she or he becomes a living member of
the Body of Christ. Baptism offers all people
membership to Christ's life-giving Body. As
St. Paul writes, "As many of you as were bap-
tized into Christ have
clothed yourselves with
j
Christ" (Galatians 3:27).
He continues this point:
|
"For in the one Spirit we I
were all baptized into '
one body — Jews or
Greeks, slaves or free—
and we were all made to
drink of one Spirit" ( 1 ',
Corinthians 12:13). ^•
The dialogue model that Patricia Agre puts
forth would help provoke both patient and
doctor into hving lives in Christ. In order for
any dialogue to take place— meaningful dia-
logue, that is—one must consider informed
consent, not as a single event or moment in
the therapy process, but as an actual process
itself.'' When viewed in this way, not only
does the patient feel more assured that she or
he will receive greater quality of care and in-
formation, but something much deeper takes
place. Constance Baker writes that by under-
standing informed consent as a process.
The interchange [between patient and
physician] can establish and enhance a
good physician-patient relationship
built on realism, trust and support.*^
Teifion Davies believes that a relationship
built on these elements must be present when
trying to give and obtain informed consent in
psychiatric research, as well:
Again, the groundwork involves
fostering partnership with keyworkers,
carers, advocates, patients' groups and,
wherever possible, the patients
themselves.^
When patient and physician trust each other,
their relationship goes beyond one of doctor-
patient, but begins to reflect the relationship
between Christ and the Father.
The relationship formed between the phy-
sician and the patient should not try to emu-
late that between a smdent and a professor in
the lecture hall. Instead, this relationship
ought to strive to imitate the manner in which
God exists. Because God exists as Trinity,
i.e., in a community of love, each Person of
the Trinity, although fully sharing in the one
Divine Essence, accepts and allows the Oth-
The relationshipformed between the
physician and the patient should not try to
emulate that between a student and a
professor in the lecture hall Instead^ this
relationship ought to strive to imitate the
manner in which God exists.
ers' particularities to exist. John Zizioulas
reminds his readers that, within the Trinity,
"otherness is absolute. The Father, the Son,
and the Spirit are absolutely different.'' ^'^
Thus, the patient and the doctor should make
every effort to make their interactions form
the same kind of community— of love and
acceptance of the other's values. Such a com-
munity "is theologically speaking, an onto-
logical category more fundamental than biol-
ogy, and hence more fundamental than fam-
ily, race, gender, or class."^ This relation-
ship or, rather, this state of "being as com-
munion" allows the doctor and the patient to
work with one another and accept their vari-
ous external differences — making the in-
formed consent process more gratifying and
complete for both parties.
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Conclusion
In Orthodox Christianity, the fact that the
Hypostasis of the Logos takes on human na-
ture represents the deepest expression of
God's love for creation. By kenosis, uniting
human nature and personalizing it to the di-
vine Hypostasis/Person. the pre-etemal Logos
once again makes it possible for all of human-
ity and creation to be reunited with their
Maker and partake in divine Glory. The Hy-
postasis of the Logos has been debated over
the centuries. It has resulted in the formula-
tion of great doctrines, but it has also been
the center of disagreement and division among
believers. Responsibility for these divisions
can be placed on the fact that people have lost
sight of the union's purpose— to transform
human beings into human persons.
Bioethics. a modem discipline compared
to theology, provides people with the oppor-
tunity to regain the mystery of the Incarna-
tion. The informed consent process, although
it often consists of highly technical language
and forms, provides human beings with the
chance to engage in meaningful relationships
with each other. Informed consent no longer
has to result in isolated living and decision-
making. Through interaction between physi-
cian and patient, each begins to live in a state
of communion—even if for the briefest mo-
ment in an emergency situation the physician
and the patient comes to glimpse the vital role
each plays in the life of the other. Thus, as
people begin to grow in communion with each
other, not only does the consent process be-
come more natural, but people also begin to
exist in cormnunion with God.
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